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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
THEODORE ROBERT BUNDY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15534 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted and sentenced and filed a brief 
with this court in Case No. 14741. Reply briefs were also filed. 
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial or a Petition for Extra-
ordinary Relief. The motion was denied and this appeal is based 
thereon, together with the direct appeal from the conviction set 
furth in the above briefs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After Appellant's conviction on March 1, 1976, a direct 
appeal was taken to this court. Briefs and reply briefs were filed 
in Case No. 14741 by both parties and the matter was set for oral 
argument. New evidence was discovered by Appellant. This case 
~s remanded to the District Court on Appellant's motion. A 
~tion for a new trial or a Petition for Extraordinary Relief was 
filed August 29, 1977. On October 3, 1977, an off the record 
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meeting was held before the Honorable Stewart H. Hanson, Jr., 
the judge who presided at the trial. Two days later, Judge 
Hanson, Jr., recused himself. (R.ll72) On October 31, 1977, 
a hearing was held before the Honorable Jay E. Banks. The 
motion was considered and evidence heard and the motion of 
Appellant was denied on November 21, 1977. From this ruling 
Appellant takes this appeal to supplement the direct appeal as 
stated above. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
In addition to the relief sought in Case No. 14741, 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the order of the Court below 
denying his bid for a new trial and a remand of the case for 
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant filed briefs on appeal and a reply brief from 
his conviction and in this Court the matter was set for oral 
argument in Case No. 14741. Due to the discovery of certain 
I 
evidence Appellant moved to remand the cause to the Third Judicia: 
District Court. That motion was granted. This was necessary so 
the Court below could consider Appellant's ~otion for a New Trial 
or Petition for Extraordinary Relief, and so the lower Court cou~ 
have the benefit of having the entire record before it in conside:j 
Appellant's new evidence and his motions based thereon. It was 
also necessary so this Court could hear one appeal rather than 
two separate appeals. 
-2-
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Hearings were held on Appellant's Motion and Petition 
and the Court denied Appellant's Motion. (R.lOSO) 
The facts of the case have been set forth to some 
extent in Appellant's Brief in Case No. 14741, primarily 
pages 2-11. Additional facts were developed in the pleadings 
and at the hearings on Appellant's Motion for a New Trial. To 
be in proper context Appellant will set them forth in detail in 
this brief because the development of the facts of the case are 
so crucial to an understanding of Appellant's claim. 
On November 8, 1974, between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m., Carol 
DaRonch was approached by a man while she was window-shopping 
in the Fashion Place Mall, Hurray, Utah. The man informed her 
that someone had tried to break into her car, and he then requested 
that she accompany him to her car to see if anything was missing. 
The man, who was believed to have represented himself as a police 
officer, walked with Ms. DaRonch to her automobile located in the 
~!all parking lot, whereupon she determined that nothing was 
missing. The man then requested that she come with him to sign 
a complaint against the person who had allegedly broken into her 
car. Agreeing to do so, Xs. DaRonch then followed the man back 
to and through the Mall, across another parking lot, across a 
street and to a point on the sidewalk in front of a laundromat. 
Until this point, DaRonch had had a couple of face to face con-
:rontations with the man, but spent most of the time walking behind 
or beside him. Although it was evening, there appeared to be ample 
Htificial lighting along the course walked. 
-3-
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At the laundromat, the man left her and approached the 
building, indicating that it was a "substation", and then re-
turned to her. This action aroused her suspicion, causing her b 
to ask him for identification, which he produced in the form of 
a badge contained in a wallet. They then walked to the man 1 s car f 
which was parked at the curbside. She entered the passenger side 
and the man the driver 1 s side. He made a u- turn, drove for p, 
approximately one half mile, and pulled abruptly to a stop in 01 
front of an elementary school. Not understanding this action, h< 
Ms. DaRonch indicated to him that this did not appear to be the tr 
police station. (R.386, 421, Exhibit 31-D) Without responding ti' sc 
her, he grabbed her arm and put a handcuff on it. They struggled I de 
briefly; she tried to open the car door; he produced what she j ha 
described as a small revolver; he told her to stop struggling or an 
he would "blow her head off"; and pulling away from him after thi< of 
threat, she exited the car. Once outside the vehicle, she found 
that he had followed her out the passenger door. He grabbed her La] 
with one hand and in the other hand, which he had raised above hi:' of 
head, he had a metal object which DaRonch grabbed in the belief r) hi~ 
was going to hit her with it. Quickly, she broke loose of his Apr 
and, with the handcuffs still dangling from her arm, ran into the boc 
street where she encountered an automobile, flagged it down, and,: For 
in a somewhat hysterical state of mind, jumped into the vehicle. abd 
Neither the occupants of the car into which DaRonch fled nor DaRo:: car 
saw anything more of her assailant or his car. She was taken tim 
immediately to the Murray Police Department. (R.l56-157) 'and 
-4-
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In her testimony at trial, DaRonch did not venture an 
estimate as to the length of time she had been with her abductor, 
but the State stipulated to a re-enactment which showed the 
period she was with the man to have been from between ten and 
u fifteen minutes. 
le Over nine months later, on August 16, 1975, Utah Highway 
Patrol Sergeant Robert Hayward pulled over a beige 1968 Volkswagen, 
o~ed and operated at the time by Appellant. Officer Hayward 
had stopped the vehicle in Granger, Utah, for failing to stop at 
the command of a police officer. A search of this vehicle at the 
t scene by Hayward and several Salt Lake County Sheriff 1 s Office 
~~! deputies revealed, among other things, a crowbar and a pair of 
handcuffs. These items were seized and Appellant was arrested 
and booked in the county jail for failing to stop at the command 
1: of Hayward. 
On August 21, 1975, Appellant was re-arrested at his Salt 
Lake City apartment pursuant to a warrant issued for the offense 
1:: of possession of burglary tools. It was the items seized from 
h: his car on August 16, 1975, which constituted the alleged tools. 
JC Appellant was taken to the Salt Lake County Jail, where he was 
Je: booked, and shortly thereafter, interrogated by a Detective Ben 
l, Forbes regarding several matters, including the November 8, 1974, 
abduction of Carol DaRonch. According to Forbes, Appellant 1 s 
~ cu resembled the one used in the DaRonch abduction. At this 
:ime. Appellant's signature was obtained on a consent form, and 
md later that afternoon his apartment was searched in his presence 
-5-
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by three Salt Lake County detectives. Following the search, 
Detective Jerry Thompson received Appellant's permission to 
take and did take several polaroid pictures of Appellant's 
automobile. 
Eleven months after the kidnapping, on October 2, 1975, 
Appellant was ordered to appear in a line-up. At the line-up, 
Ms. DaRonch made a positive identification of Appellant. He was 
immediately placed under arrest, and charged with aggravated 
kidnapping in violation of Utah Code Ann., Section 76-5-302 
(Supp. 1975). (R.863) On February 22, 1976, a bench trial was 
held in the T~:c:::i !·~.::.;..cia:. District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
presiding. The prosecution was based on the eyewitness identi-
fication testimony of DaRonch. There was no physical evidence 
or other identification testimony to corroborate the DaRonch 
identification. Circumstantial evidence presented was remote, 
if not improbative. Appellant was convicted on March 1, 1976, 
and was sentenced to an indeterminant term of between one and 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on June 30, 1976. 
According to police reports released to Appellant's couns' 
prior to his trial, the first reported action taken in regard 
to Appellant as a suspect in the DaRonch matter, after the 
August 21, 1975, search of his apartment, occurred on September 
1975. A police report by Detective Jerry Thompson indicated tha: 
on September 1, he met with Ms. DaRonch at her place of work an~ 
showed to her the polaroid pictures of Appellant's car. after 
-6-
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i, 
1as 
a: 
which he showed her a photographic array of between twenty and 
thirty pictures, one of which being a mug shot taken of Appellant 
during his booking on August 16, 1975. (R.432,435) Thompson's 
September 1 report will be analyzed in depth later, but in essence, 
it alleges that DaRonch made a tentative identification of Appellant. 
Further, it said that DeRonch expressed an opinion that she would 
be able and willing to identify her kidnapper in person at a 
physical lineup. 
Next, according to pretrial discovery material, DaRonch 
was shown another photographic array containing a driver's license 
~hoto of Appellant taken in December, 1974. Again, DaRonch pur-
' portedly made a "looks like" identification according to a 
Bountiful City Police Department report of September 4, 1975. 
, The reports then reveal that on September 8, 1975, DaRonch was 
taken to the address where Appeallant resided and there viewed 
his car. The report in question stated that DaRonch indicated 
"this looks like the car ... ". (R.504, 875, 843) 
The only other contact with the victim, admitted to by 
?olice which occurred prior to the October 2 lineup, occurred 
on or about September 30, 1975. At this time, DaRonch was taken 
to the University of Utah College of Law to view Appellant, but 
~was not there that day. The four contacts described above 
11ere confirmed both by discovery material and pretrial hearing 
and trial testimony. (R. 568, 864-865) 
-7-
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In preparing for pretrial hearings and trial, Appellant's 
counsel relied heavily on the statements and representations con-
tained in the police reports mentioned above, which dealt with 
critical pre-lineup contacts made with DaRonch by police. 
In January, 1977, Appellant was extradited to Pitkin Coun: 
Colorado, to face a murder charge. In April, 1977, he success-
fully applied to the Colorado court to permit him to proceed with· 
out counsel. During that same month, he filed extensive discover 
motions, including motions directly related to the DaRonch kid-
napping case because the Colorado prosecuting authorities had 
indicated that thev would attempt to use such evidence as a 
"similar transaction" to the Colorado offense. In response to 
a court order on the discovery motions, a meeting was held in 
Glenwood Springs, Colorado, on ~ay 24, 1977, between Milton K. 
Blakey, a special prosecutor with the Pitkin County District 
Attorney's Office; Michael Fisher, an investigator for the 
District Attorney's Office; and the defendant, prose. The pur-
pose of the meeting was for the prosecutor to release to Appell~: 
all court ordered or otherwise discoverable material in his files 
(R. 989-991, 1005-1007) 
During the course of the discovery session, ~ichael Fishe:. 
gave Appellant a nine page document which Fisher said had been 
sent to him by Detective Jerry Thompson. The first line of the 
document reads: "The below report is being compiled by Detective 
Jerry Thompson, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, on 9-10-75." 
-8-
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t 's 
on· 
)Unc 
lth· 
1€[': 
The disclosure of this document has been noted in reports on that 
discovery session filed by Mr. Blakey and Appellant with the 
Clerk of the Pitkin County District Court, the same document 
having been heretofore filed in this case. (R. 992-996) 
The nine page document disclosed in Colorado is actually 
two reports: one four page report followed by a five page report. 
The second five page report begins with a description of Thompson's 
search of Appellant's apartment on August 21, 1975, and continues 
·.-ith activities occurring on August 22, 1975, which includes 
Thompson's showing to DaRonch pictures of Appellant and Appellant's 
automobile. This second Thompson report (R.984) shall be referred 
to throughout this brief as the "suppressed report". 
A reading of this report shows that it contains a number 
of very exculpatory statements which go directly to the reliability 
of DaRonch as an eyewitness, which directly contradict a Thompson 
report on this same incident (September 1, 1975) released to 
Appellant's counsel prior to the DaRonch kidnapping trial, and 
.an:, ·.-hich had never been made known to Appellant or his defense counsel 
.es ?rior to or during the kidnapping trial. 
In December, 1975, the Salt Lake County prosecutor gave 
he: defense counsel a Thompson report typed on a "Follow-up Report" 
:arm. (R.983) The report was dated September 1, 1975. This 
~eport shall be r~:ferred to throughout this brief as the "released 
ve report". The relevant portion of that report reads: 
-9-
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"She went through the stack of pictures 
and pulled Mr. Bundy's picture out, handed me 
the stack back and stated, 'I don't see anyone 
in there'. I then asked her what the one was 
doing in her hand. She stated, 'Oh, I forgot 
this', and handed it back to me. She was 
questioned as to why she pulled it out. She 
stated, 'I don't know, it looks something like 
him. I really don't know, I can't be sure, but 
it does look a lot like him'. She was asked 
at this time if she would be willin , if we ot 
a ineup set up, to view t e in ivi ua in 
person. She stated that she would be more 
than willing to and that if she saw the indi-
vidual in erson she felt rather confident that 
she cou identi y him. ~Emphasis a ded. 
Thompson's repcr-t c;iven to defendant on May 24, 1977, 
referred to as the suppressed report, reads in part as follows: 
" ... In going through the pictures, she pulled 
out Hr. Bundy's picture in her hand, gave the pictures 
back to this officer, stating, 'I don't see anyone 
in there that resembles him'. She was asked what 
the one was doing in her hand. She stated, 'Oh, 
here'. I asked her if that was the guy or why she 
pulled it out. She stated, 'I don't know, aah, I 
guess it looks something like him'. She was asked 
if she was afraid to identify him, and she stated 
no. She said, 'That looked maybe somethin9 like 
him, she really tust didn't know, she didn t think 
she could identi y him if she saw him again or 
not. This is aver oor witness in this detective's 
I on t know i she can identi v the 
she is scare or what the situation 
date, communication is still going 
on with several other agencies by this detective 
and Detective Forbes. They are attempting to come 
up with a lineup on this individual through Bounti-
ful and possibly some other state's witnesses 
coming in. It has not been set up yet." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The suppressed version of Thompson's report gives 
the distinct impression that DaRonch did not identify Appellant 
("she really just didn't know"), and that in addition, she 
-10-
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expressed her doubt that she would be able to identify her abductor 
again if she did see him. This is a far cry from the "official" 
version which has DaRonch expressing confidence about identifying 
the man in person at a lineup. In fact, Thompson makes no request 
whatsoever that DaRonch attend a lineup in the suppressed report. 
In the released version, Appellant comes off looking "a lot like" 
the abductor, while in the suppressed version he "looked maybe 
something like him" but "she really just didn't know". 
Equally as devastating is the revelation in the suppressed 
report that, "This is a very poor witness in this detective's opinion 
and I don't know if she can identify the individual or if she is 
scared or what the situation is". The implications of this 
statement are far-reaching. Thompson, a veteran investigator, 
calls DaRonch a "very poor witness". He then expressed doubt 
that she had made any kind of identification of the accused 
("I don't know if she can identify the individual ... "). 
There is an obvious problem. The suppressed report depicts 
, a witness who is confused to the point that no one knows if she 
has or if she can make an identification. The released report's 
assertion that she "felt rather confident she could identify him" 
in a lineup is patently absurd and false. It is now apparent why 
no lineup was held until over a month after this first photo 
display: DaRonch was a poor witness who had failed to pick the 
I suspect's picture. 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The suppressed report closes with Thompson looking for a 
way to "come up with a lineup on this individual" through 
witnesses in other jurisdictions. His opinion that DaRonch is 
a "very poor witness" is emphasized even further by his rejection 
of using DaRonch in a lineup. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BOTH THE SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY HAD A DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
DETECTIVE THOMPSON'S SUPPRESSED REPORT. 
Detective Jerry Thompson testified at the trial that 
the first time Carol DaRonch was approached regarding Theodore 
Bundy was on September l, 1975, and that was the only time that 
he had shown her photographs. He testified that he gave her 
a packet of 27 photographs of different individuals, one of 
which was a photograph of Appellant, Theodore Bundy; that she 
looked through the packet to determine if any of the men depictec 
resembled the man who had abducted her; that in looking through 
the packet she removed the photograph of Theodore Bundy, looked 
through the rest of the stack and returned it to the witness 
with the co=en t: "I don't see anyone in here"; that he then 
asked her, "how about the photograph that was in her hand," and 
she replied: "Oh this one, I don't know. Here", and handed it 
to the witness; that the witness "then asked her why she pulled 
that photograph out, if there was something significant about it 
and that Carol DaRonch then said: 
lot like the individual but I'm not 
-12-
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Jerry Thompson further testified that he gave another 
?hotograph of Appellant to officers of the Bountiful Police to 
show to Carol DaRonch. Detective Ira Beal testified that on 
m September 4, 1975, he showed to Carol DaRonch a packet of eight 
pictures, containing a photograph of Appellant, but no other 
photograph that she had seen before and, particularly, no 
photographs of the four other individuals she had previously 
picked as looking like her abductor. (R. 525-529, 975, 1066) 
Carol DaRonch testified that she did not recall what 
she said to Detective Thompson on September 1, 1975, in regard 
to Appellant's photograph and had even a hazier recollection 
regarding the photograph shown to her by Detective Beal on 
September 4, 1975. (R. 974, 1006) 
On December 19, 1975, the defendant filed a Motion 
for Order Requiring Disclosure that requested, among other things, 
that the court order the County Attorney's Office "to produce 
:or inspection all written reports in the possession of the State 
concerning the investigation of this case" and "to disclose to 
the defendant any and all evidence which is or may be favorable 
or exculpatory to the defendant . . including reports concerning 
the viewing of photographs by Carol DaRonche (sic) and . . . any 
occasions Carol DaRonche (sic) was shown photographs of defendant 
"nd either made no identification or failed to make a certain 
identification." At a hearing on this motion on December 12, 
:975, before the Honorable Peter Leary, the prosecuting attorney 
-13-
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agreed to provide defense counsel with the reports regarding 
the two times Carol DaRonch had been shown the defendant's 
photographs according to the police officers and the court 
ordered him to do so. (R. 976, 1006) 
On January 15, 1976, defendant's Motion for Disclosure 
came on for further hearing before the Honorable Peter Leary. 
I 
I 
I 
At that time the prosecuting attorney, David Yocom, agreed to 
furnish the reports requested in the motion which were in his 
possession and the court so ordered. Defense counsel expressed I c 
I 
his concern that the Sheriff's Office may have a report pertaining 
1 
to this incident which tends to be exculpatory to this defendant 
and which they may withhold from the County Attorney and therefore 
requested the court to make the order directly applicable to law 
enforcement agencies. David Yocom represented to the court that T 
he had examined the entire records of the Salt Lake County SherWI 0 
Office and that, "I know what is contained in that record relating 
to this particular offense and I can represent to the court that 
I have everything in that record pertaining to this particular 
t: 
t] 
i 
offense." The court, expressly relying upon Mr. Yocom's represenc, il 
tion, declined to extend the order to directly apply to the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff. (R. 976, 991, 1006) 
On January 15, 1976, the prosecution filed a written 
Reply to Defendant's Motion for Disclosure, over the signature 
St 
S< 
ic 
f h C ! Ja o t e ounty Attorney by David Yocom, which stated that the 
-14-
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reports concerning the viewing of photographs by Carol DaRonch 
had been previously submitted to counsel for the defendant. 
(R. 977. 1006) 
On February 17, 1976, the Honroable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Jr. issued an order directed to the Sheriff of Salt Lake County 
and Captain N.D. Hayward, among others, directing them to 
' forthwith deliver to David Yocom copies of all reports, memoranda, 
and correspondence pertaining, in any way, to the investigation 
of the abduction of Carol DaRonch. (R.82) 
The only report concerning the September l, 1975 viewing 
of photographs by Carol DaRonch furnished to counsel for the 
defense was a document purporting to be a "Follow-up Report''. 
dated September l, 1975, with the typed "signature" of Jerry 
Thompson. This report conformed substantially with the testimony 
I if:· of Jerry Thompson at the trial, and is referred to hereafter as 
in[ the "disclosed report." (R. 983, 977, 1007) This report, in 
addition to the matters discussed in paragraph 3, supra, contained 
:he statement: "She was asked at this time if she would be willing. 
en:: i: we got a line-up set up, to view the individual in person. 
She stated she would be more than willing to and that if she 
saw the individual in person felt rather confident that she could 
identify him." 
At a hearing on defendant's ~otion to Suppress, held on 
1 January 21, 1976, before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. 
-15-
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Jerry Thompson testified, under oath, that the Disclosed Report 
reflected what Carol DaRonch did and said during the viewing of 
photographs on September 1, 1975, as best he could recall. 
(R.977, 978, 1007) 
On May 24, 1977, Michael Fisher, an investigator for the 
Pitkin County, Colorado, District Attorney's Office, in the 
presence of Milton K. Blakey, Deputy District Attorney for Pitkin 
County, handed to Theodore Bundy a report which Michael Fisher 
stated he had received from Jerry Thompson of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Ofi~ce. This report also describes, among other 
things, the viewing of photographs, including a photograph of 
Theodore Bundy, by Carol DaRonch at the request of Jerry Thompson 
The suppressed report and the disclosed report, although 
written by the same detective and described the same incident 
differ in the following significant particulars: 
(a) The disclosed report states that Carol DaRonch in-
formed Detective Thompson that "if she saw the individual in 
person she felt rather confident that she could identify him," 
while the suppressed report states, "she didn't think she could 
identify him if she saw him again or not." 
(b) In the disclosed report and in his testimony, 
Detective Thompson indicated that after Miss DaRonch said that 
she did not see anyone in the packet of pictures, that he asked 
her, in neutral language, why she had pulled Mr. Bundy's picture 
-16-
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.r. 
out and she replied, "I don't know, I can't be sure, but it looks 
something like him. I really don't know, I can't be sure, but 
it does look a lot like him." Whereas, the suppressed report 
states that Detective Thompson asked the suggestive question 
"if that was the guy or why she pulled it out" and she replied, 
"I don't know, aah, I guess it looks something like him." The 
suppressed report then indicates that Detective Thompson asked 
' the additional highly suggestive and challenging question, if 
she was afraid to identify Mr. Bundy, which she denied and then 
conceded "that looked maybe something like him." 
(c) The disclosed report does not reflect Detective 
1 Thompson's opinion that Carol DaRonch was "a very poor witness" 
ml as does t~e suppressed report. 
(d) The whole tone of the disclosed report indicates 
a fair viewing process conducted by an objective detective who 
obtained a tentative identification which called for further 
efforts to determine if the victim could actually make an 
identification. Whereas, the suppressed report reflects the 
frustration of a detective who attempted and failed to get the 
victim to make an identification of a person he regarded as 
guilty and dangerous and indicates that those attitudes were 
conveyed to the victim. 
Had the suppressed report been disclosed to the defense, 
?ursuant to the orders of the court and the State's duty to 
-17-
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divulge exculpatory evidence, it would have been of great value 
to the defense in the cross-examination of Carol DaRonch and 
Jerry Thompson and in establishing the defense theory that 
Carol DaRonch was initially unable to identify the defendant 
but was induced to do so by police officers who, by repeatedly 
showing Appellant's photograph, taking her in attempts to view 
the defendant and his automobile, inducing her to positively 
identify his automobile, even though she testified that it 
"looked completelv different" and identified it because "it was 
supposed to be ':he ca:::-." and generally convincing her that Appell1· 
was the man who had kidnapped her and she was supposed to identif: 
him. 
The failure to disclose the suppressed report, the con-
cealment of its existence by representations made to the court 
by the prosecutor, the delivery of the disclosed report and the 
testimony of Jerry Thompson that it accurately described the 
initial viewing, and the testimony of Jerry Thompson describing 
the initial viewing, all constituted a fraud upon the court and 
the defense and severely hampered the truth-finding process per-
taining to the most critical issue at trial. 
The foregoing described acts and omissions of the State 
effectively denied defendant his right to confront witnesses and 
his right to due process of law in violation of Sections 7 and l2 
Article I of the Constitution of Utah and the 6th and 14th Arnendl::e:. 
to the Constitution of the United States. 
-18-
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This Court in State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975), 
announced the rule governing nondisclosure of evidence favorable 
and material to criminal defendants: 
" ... (S)uppression or destruction of evidence 
by those charged with prosecution, including police 
officers, constitutes a denial of due process if 
the evidence is material to guilt or innocence of 
the defendant in a criminal case ... " 
!!._, at 478. 
The rule in Stewart is even broader in scope than that 
of the leading United States Supreme Court case in the field of 
la- suppression of evidence, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
in which the Court said: 
"We now hold that the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or 
bad faith of the prosecution." 
I!_, 373 U.S. at 87. 
Stewart's extension of the duty to disclose to police 
officers has also been approved by the United States Supreme 
Court in its opinion in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
(1972): 
"Moreover, whether the nondisclosure was 
a result of negligence or design, it is the 
responsibility of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's 
office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman 
for the Government." 
~- 405 U.S. at 154. If the police were not burdened with a duty 
:o disclose, the prosecutor could successfully claim that police 
-19-
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officers, who did the principle investigation of a case, had 
withheld exculpatory information from him, and, therefore, 
that he had no duty to disclose the material. This would leave 
the defendant with no assertable claim when his right to a fair 
trial had been clearly abridged. To impede due process disclosure 
in this fashion would effectively abrogate the fundamental fair-
ness objectives sought by the many constitutional decisions 
requiring disclosure of favorable and material evidence to the 
defendant. For this reason, 
The police are also part of the 
prosecution, and the taint on the trial is 
no less if they, rather than the State's 
Attorney, were guilty of nondisclosure. 
* * * * * * * * * 
"The duty to disclose is that of the 
state, which ordinarily acts through the 
prosecuting attorney; but if he too is the 
victim of police suppression of the material 
information, the state's failure is not on 
that account excused. We cannot condone an 
attempt to connect the defendant with the 
crime by questionable inferences which 
might be refuted by undisclosed and unpro-
duced documents in the hands of the police." 
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964). 
In the instant case, not only did the prosecutor and othe: 
agencies investigating the offense charged have a constitutional 
due process duty to divulge information favorable and material 
to the defense, but the trial judge had also imposed a strict 
order, directing that exculpatory material be disclosed to the 
-20-
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defense. On February 17, 1976, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Jr., of the Third Judicial District Court, conducted a pretrial 
conference attended by David Yocom, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney prosecuting the case, and John D. O'Connell and Bruce 
Lubeck, counsel for the defendant. A transcript of that pro-
ceeding shows that Judge Hanson issued the following oral 
discovery order: 
"I think the discussion Friday ended on that 
note that I was convinced in my own mind that the 
law not only is that the Prosecutor has a duty to 
turn over any exculpatory materials to the Defense 
upon request, that extends not only to anything 
in his possession but anything in the possession 
of anyone else. And I think that is the law. 
And the gist of what I was saying Friday was that 
anything that relates to Miss DaRonch in any way 
from any agency should be turned over to Mr. 
Yocom so he can review it to make a determination 
whether there are in fact any exculpatory materials 
which he has a duty to give over to the Defense 
in this matter." (tr. at 5-6). 
Due process imposes certain obligations on law enforcement 
and investigatory agencies to insure every criminal trial is a 
"search for the truth, not an adversary game." United States 
v. Perry, 471 F.2d 1057, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The principle 
behind establishing such a burden on the State "is not the 
?unishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but 
avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Brady v. Maryland, 
supra., 373 U.S. at 87. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
(1976), the Supreme Court underscores this point by stating that 
-21-
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the constitutional obligation is measured not "by the moral 
culpability or the willfulness of the prosecutor" and that if 
constitutional error has occurred "it is because of the character 
of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor." Id., 49 
L.Ed.2d at 353. Therefore, 
" ... When the prosecutor receives a specific 
and relevant request, the failure to make any 
response is seldom, if ever, excused." 
~. 49 L.Ed.2d at 351. 
In the present case, it is clear that the prosecutor and 
the investigating agencies had an unmistakable duty to disclose 
to Appellant exculpatory information, including the suppressed 
police report in question. The law, the trial court's order on 
discovery, and defense counsel's specific and repeated requests 
for such information all created that duty. Failure to release 
the suppressed report, which gives an exculpatory version of the 
victim's first viewing of defendant's picture, is totally inexcus· 
able. 
POINT II 
THE SUPPRESSED POLICE REPORT IS FAVORABLE AND MATERIAL 
BECAUSE IT EFFECTIVELY DISCREDITS THE RELIABILITY OF 
THE STATE'S SOLE EYEWITNESS TO THE CRIME. THIS IS 
PARTICULARLY TRUE GIVEN THE OVERALL WEAK.~ESS OF THE 
STATE'S CASE. 
In United States v. Agurs, supra. , the Supreme Court not< 
that newly discovered evidence in the possession of the prosecute 
places it in a "different category than if it had simply been 
-22-
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discovered from a neutral source after trial." Id. , 49 L. Ed2d at 
354. The defendant seeking a new trial because the State withheld 
:ter evidence material and favorable to him "should not have to satisfy 
f9 the severe burden of demonstrating that newly discovered evidence 
probably would have resulted in acquittal." Id., 49 L.Ed.2d at 
354. This must be the rule because: 
" ... If the new standard applied to the 
usual motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence were the same when the 
evidence was in the State's possession as when 
md it was found in a neutral source, there would 
be no special significance to the prosecutor's 
:e obligation to serve the cause of justice." 
~. 49 L.Ed.2d at 354. 
There can be no question in the present case that the State 
.s suppressed evidence. It has also been shown that regardless of 
e the motivation for failing to disclose the report, both the police 
he and the prosecutor had a duty to disclose it. Now it is necessary 
cus· to determine to what degree Appellant was prejudiced by the 
nondisclosure. Is the report in question material enough and 
exculpatory enough to warrant the finding of constitutional error? 
In Barbee v. Harden, supra. , a formula for showing prejudice is 
outlined: 
"How strong a showing is required in a 
given case will depend on the nature of the 
ot< charge, the testimony of the state, and the 
role the undisclosed testimony would likely 
utc have played." 
!i:._, at 847. 
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1. The Role the Undisclosed Testimony Would Likely Have 
Played. A substantial issue in any trial may be the credibility 
of prosecution witness because "(t)he jury's estimate of the 
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence ... " Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 269, (1959). In Giglio v. United States, supra., 
the government's case depended almost entirely on a co-conspirator 
named Taliento. The government failed to reveal that Taliento 
had been promised immunity in return for his testimony. Commenti~; 
on how the importance of this witness influenced the trial, the 
Supreme Court said· 
":tere tne Government's case depended 
entire:y on Taliento's testimony, without it 
there could have been no indictment and no 
evidence to carry the case to the jury. 
Taliento's credibility as a witness was 
therefore an important issue in the case, 
... and the jury was entitled to know it." 
ID 
~. 405 U.S. at 154-155. In Giglio, the Court decided that v 
"when the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative 
of guilt or innocence", then suppression of evidence of this kind ti 
warrants a new trial. Id., 405 U.S. at 154. 
The issue of reliability takes on added significance in ?l 
cases based on eyewitness identification. The suppressed report ~ 
of Detective Thompson goes directly to the reliability of Carol 
DaRonch, the victim and sole eyewitness to the crime with which 
Appellant was charged. Without DaRonch's testimony, as without 
Taliento's, there could have been no charge filed against 
Appellant and no evidence sufficient to support a conviction. 
-24-
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re According to the suppressed report, after she vie'I-Jed Appellant's 
:y ?icture closely, "She said, 'That looked maybe something like 
him', she really just didn't know, she didn't think she could 
identify him (her abductor) if she saw him again or not." 
~othing Ms. DaRonch could ever have said could have affected the 
reliability of her alleged identification of the defendant more 
Ltor profoundly. Suppression of this evidence requires the same result 
as found in Giglio: Reversal and a new trial. 
.tir.; Eyewitness identification cases are particularly affected 
by suppression of evidence because the suppression thwarts effective 
cross-examination which might reveal mis-identification. A case 
in point can be found in Norris v. Slayton, 450 F.2d 1241 (4th 
Cir. 1976). A rape victim was held by her assailant for forty-five 
minutes. About thirty minutes after the man left the victim's 
house, the defendant was apprehended by police in the area of the 
victim's home, taken back to her for identification, and identified 
ive by her attacker. The defendant was convicted of rape solely on 
nd the testimony of the victim. 
The police officer, who apprehended the defendant and was 
?resent at the time the victim identified him, wrote a report 
·vhich said: 
"I took him to Mrs. McDaniel's house, who 
met us at the back porch screen door and the 
first thing she said was 'that is the man'. I 
said, 'Mrs. McDan~els are you sure?', and she 
hesitated and said, 'I know that is the man but 
cannot swear to it'.'' 
-25-
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~. at 1244. The prosecutor was aware of this report but 
Norris' defense counsel were not furnished with a copy. Asses-
sing the materiality of the new evidence in light of the importanc 
of the witness' testimony, the Court in Norris said: 
" ... The primary issue before the jury 
was the identification of the petitioner ... 
This evidence was of crucial value to the 
defense in cross-examining both Officer 
Leake and t1rs. McDaniels on her identifi-
cation of Norris, especially in view of 
her equivocation at the preliminary hearing. 
It was evidence which had a direct bearing 
upon the critical issue in the case and might 
'reasonabl~ have weakened or overcome testi-
monv a::ve:-se to the defendant. • Barbee, 
supra .. at 847." 
~. at 1244. 
The Norris court finally held that the recent decision of 
United States v. Agurs, supra., did not require a different 
result, since the suppressed report "was of such a nature to 
raise a substantial likelihood that it would have affected the 
result in Norris' trial." Id., at 1244. 
Courts are particularly apt to set aside convictions 
based on the eyewitness identification testimony if only one 
person is involved and the State has suppressed evidence tending 
to reduce the reliability of that identification. In Austin v. 
Wyrick, 535 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976), the petitioner was convicte: 
solely on the eyewitness testimony of the victim who had given 
inconsistant and conflicting statements regarding the identity o: 
his assailant. These statements were contained in police reports 
not disclosed to defense counsel. The Circuit Court said· 
-26-
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magis-
an 
li:_, at 445. 
In Norris, Austin, and the present case, the prosecutions 
relied heavily, if not exclusively, upon the victims' identification 
of the accused. Each case involved a single, eyewitness/victim 
' of the incident. In all these cases, the State withheld a 
,f 
e: 
police report wherein the victim expressed doubt about her 
identification of the accused. In Norris, for example, the 
identification of the accused was far stronger than the one in 
the present case, but the court's concern about the impact of 
the suppressed evidence on the reliability of the identification 
caused it to reverse the case. Suppression of Detective Thompson's 
:eport, a report Hhich casts much doubt on the ability of the 
~itness to identify Appellant or her abductor, denied Appellant 
effective cross-examination of the Hitness on the critical issue 
of reliability, and violated his right to due process. 
2. The Nature of the Charge. A second factor to be 
considered when assessing materiality of suppressed evidence, is the 
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nature of eyewitness testimony and the danger inherent therein. 
The present case involved the showing to the victim a picture of 
defendant on two occasions prior to her alleged identification 
of Appellant at the lineup. She testified at trial that she 
could have picked Appellant from the lineup based on having seen 
his pictures alone and that Appellant was the only one in the 
lineup who looked like his pictures. (R. 446) She also testifiec 
that she identified Appellant automobile, even though it looked 
"completely different". because she had been led to believe that 
it was the same car she had seen in some pictures. (R.441) She 
testified that she associated the car she had "identified" with 
the pictures she had seen of Appellant. All this occurred prior 
to the lineup where she identified Appellant. The United States 
Supreme Court spoke of the dangers of this kind of situation when 
it wrote: 
"It must be recognized that improper 
employment of photographs may sometimes 
cause witnesses to err in identifying 
criminals .... This danger is increased if 
the police display to the witness ... the 
pictures of several persons among which 
the photograph of a single such individ-
ual recurs or is in some way emphasized. 
~he chance of misidentification is heightened 
1f the police indicate they have other 
evidence that one of the persons pictured 
committed the crime. Regardless of how 
the initial misidentification comes about, 
the witness thereafter is apt to retain in 
his memory theimage of the photograph 
rather than the person actually seen, re-
d~cing the trustworthiness of subsequent 
l1neup or courtroom identification." 
-k 
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" ... The danger that use of the 
technique may result in convictions based 
on misidentification may be substantially 
lessened by a course of cross-examination 
at trial which exposes to the jury the 
method's potential for error." 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-384, 19 L.Ed. 2d 
1247, 88 S. Ct. 967 (1968). 
Cross-examination, then, is the means by which errors 
imbedded in critical identification testimony are exposed. In 
Norris v. Slayton, supra., Austin v. Wyrick, supra., and the 
present case, the suppression of the police reports regarding 
witness uncertainty and confusion in identifying the accused 
significantly decreased the defense's ability to explore, through 
cross-examination, the crucial issue: Reliability. The suppres-
sed evidence in this case is material in part due to obvious 
potential for misidentification established by Ms. DaRonch's 
testimony. The Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, (1967), warned: 
" ... The vagaries of eyewitness identi-
fication are well-known; the annals of 
criminal law are rife with instances of 
mistaken identification ... A major factor 
contributing to the high incidence of mis-
carriages of justice from mistaken identi-
fication has been from the degree of sug-
gestion inherent in the manner in which the 
prosecution presents the suspect to the 
witnesses for pretrial identification." 
Id., 388 U.S. at 228-229. 
* * 
"Insofar as the accused conviction may 
rest on a courtroom identification in fact 
the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification 
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which the accused is helpless to subject to 
effective scrutiny at trial, the accused is 
deprived of that right of cross-examination 
which is an essential safeguard to confront 
witnesses against him." 
~. 388 U.S. at 235. 
United States v. Wade stands for the extension of a 
defendant's right to counsel in a post-indictment lineup. It is 
not Appellant's contention that the suppression of evidence in 
this case is covered by Wade, since the notion that an attorney 
should represent a suspect at a pretrial photographic display 
has thus far been rejected as unworkable. The point to be 
illustrated, however. is that out-ot-court photographic lineups 
monetheless are subject to the same dangers as post-indictment, 
corporeal lineups, and that the goals of fairness and confronta-
tion enunciated in Wade and Simmons should be considered when 
evaluating the materiality of evidence which relates to pretrial 
identification, and which has been suppressed by the State. 
The conclusion based on this approach is that the suppresr 
of the Thompson report of a photographic display shown to the so: 
eyewitness and victim, Carol DaRonch, thwarted Appellant's 
ability to fully and fairly expose through cross-examination the 
critical issue of reliability, and that his inability to do so 
may well have been dispositive of the guilty verdict against him 
3. The Testimony of the State. A third factor to be eM 
sidered when assessing the materiality of the new evidence is 
-30-
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the overall weakness of the testimony adduced at trial which 
purported to inculpate the defendant. See Appellant's Brief, 
Point I. The lack of a strong case against the accused in 
Austin v. Wyrick, supra., was certainly a factor in reversing 
that case, since the court there noted the "thin" evidence in 
the Austin case. On reviewing the suppressed evidence here 
in the context of the entire record, "if the verdict is already 
of questional validity, additional evidence of relatively minor 
importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt." 
United States v. Agurs, supra., 49 L.Ed.2d at 355. The weakness 
of the case against Appellant shall be briefly analyzed, as in 
Appellant's Brief, Point I, and the evidence shall be divided into 
two categories: Identification and circumstantial. 
The identification testimony of Carol DaRonch grew out 
of her identification of Appellant in a lineup held eleven months 
after her abduction, during which she had been with her abductor 
from between ten and fifteen minutes. She identified Appellant 
at the lineup on the basis first of his walk (R. 412-413), al-
though she had never told police officers there was anything 
distinctive about her abductor's walk. She also picked Appellant 
at the lineup because of his face (R.413), although she said 
there was nothing distinctive about his face in particular 
(R. 413), and her memory of her abductor's face was so vague 
that she first said he had a mustache, then decided a few days 
later that he did not, then finally felt that he did. (R. 427, 
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428, 489, 491). Appellant did not have a mustache at the line~ 
nor did he have one at the time of the kidnapping. The victim 
testified that she could have recognized Appellant from seeing 
his pictures alone, and that nobody else in the lineup looked 
like Appellant's picture. (R. 446) Nothing else about Appella' 
at the lineup reminded DaRonch of her abductor, although she 
did think Appellant looked different from her abductor because 
Appellant was shorter and more clean cut. (R. 412) She was 
posi::::..ve -:-: ~er :.dentification of Appellant at the lineup and 
in court, but as the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Wa: 
supra., "(i)t is a matter of connon experience that once a witr.i 
has picked out the accused at the (pretrial confrontation), he. 
not likely to go back on his word later on." 388 U.S. at 229. 
Da Rench's alleged identification of Appellant's car is 
equally troublesome. She described her abductor's car on the 
night of her abduction as light blue or white, with lots of 
rust spots and dents and a rip on the top of the right side of 
the rear seat. (R. 471, 478) She did not change her descripti 
of that automobile until after seeing three pictures of Appella:' 
car shown her over nine months later. No pictures of other 
Volkswagen sedans were mixed in with pictures of Appellant's cz: 
These poor quality Polaroid pictures depict a beige Volkswagen 
with a rip across the entire length of the back seat, and with 
no visible rust spots. At the time she saw these pictures, s~ 
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i 
said that the car "resembled" the car she had ridden in when she 
was abducted, although the night of her abduction she told police 
that all Volkswagens looked alike to her. (Exhibit 6, page 6) 
Later she was taken to see Appellant's car while it was parked 
on the street. At trial she testified that the car she had been 
abducted in was beige, that she had never described it as light 
blue (R. 420, 421); and that the rip she had seen that night 
went all the way across the top of the back seat. (R. 406) 
Thus, her testimony had conformed to the appearance of Appellant's 
vehicle. 
She said that she could identify Appellant's car from 
the pictures because it did not have a front license plate, and 
because of the damage depicted on the passenger door. (R. 407, 
432, 433) However, none of the pictures shown to her reveal the 
front of the car, so one cannot determine if there is a license 
plate there or not, and none of the pictures shown to her show 
visible damage to the passenger door. (R. 433, 434; Exhibit 21) 
\fuen asked if the car she had seen in person was the same car she 
had been abducted in, she noted that it was completely different, 
having a different color, no ripped back seat, and no rust spots. 
~ (R. 439) She might have identified it, however, because the 
police were not going to take her to see the wrong car, because 
she knew it had been changed, and because the police had told her 
that it was the car in the pictures. (R. 439) Such are the 
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dangers of one car or one man show-ups as mentioned in Simmons 
-United States, supra. , when the witness may "retain in his 
memory the image of the photograph rather than the person actuo. 
seen." ~. 390 U.S. at 383-384. "Subsequent identification c 
the accused then shows nothing except that the picture was a 
good likeness." Hammelman & Williams, Identification Parades r: 
(1963) Grim. L. Rev., at 448. DaRonch's identification of 
Appellant's car is one influenced profoundly by suggestion. 
The State's circumstantial case was at best remote in 
probative value. While Appellant's blood type "0" was the same 
type as a small quanti:? of blood found on DaRonch's coat three 
days after her abduction, officers, who closely examined her 
coat on thenight of her abduction, could find no blood stains, 
and DaRonch could not remember scratching the man. Handcuffs 
owned by Appellant were not the same make or model as the 
ones which the victim escaped wearing on her arm. DaRonch neve: 
saw the metal instrument held by her abductor, nor did she eve; 
testify that the crowbar belonging to Appellant resembled 
the metal object she felt that night. Appellant's ownership 
of patent leather shoes was conflicting. In any event no sue~ 
shoes were introduced. That was the entirety of the circumstar: 
tial case against Appellant. There was no physical evidence 
presented and no other eyewitness testimony to corroborate the 
Da Ranch identification. The evidence against Appellant was 
thin. 
Finally, when considering the amount and character of 
evidence, or lack thereof, against A?pellant. it s~ould be 
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noted that this was a bench trial. Judge Hanson spent three 
days deliberating the evidence. He characterized his decision 
as extremely difficult. It is apparent that to this judge the 
case was closely balanced, and the misconduct which forestalled 
effective cross-examination and impeachment of the key prosecution 
witness may have tipped the balance beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. Summary. 
(a) Suppression of evidence affecting credibility of 
key prosecution witnesses violates due process, Giglio v. United 
States, supra., Napue v. Illinois, supra. 
(b) Carol DaRonch was the sole eyewitness and victim 
to her abduction. Without her testimony, Appellant would not 
have been charged or convicted. A report stating that after 
she first saw Appellant's picture, she said she could not identify 
her abductor, was suppressed. 
(c) Materiality of suppressed evidence is enhanced 
by a verdict of questionable validity. United States v. Agurs, 
supra., Austin v. Wyrick, supra. 
(d) DaRonch's identification testimony is very incon-
sistant and indicative of susceptibility to suggestion, and the 
circumstantial evidence introduced is of little value. 
(e) The nature of eyewitness identification testimony 
makes effective cross-examination essential. Norris v. Slayton, 
supra., Simmons v. United States, supra., United State v. Wade, 
supra. 
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(f) Suppression of Thompson's police report denied 
Appellant crucial material to cross-examine Ms. DaRonch and 
Thompson on her ability to identify Appellant. 
(g) Appellant need not show that the new evidence would 
probably result in acquittal, United States v. Agurs, supra., or 
that it would have proved innocence. Barbee v. Warden, supra. 
(h) Rather, if it might reasonably have overcome or 
weakened testimony adverse to Appellant and cause a reasonable 
likelihood it could have affected the result, then there has be~ 
a constitutional error. Norris v. Slayton, supra. 
The new evidence in this case satisfies the standard of 
materiality giving rise to the prosecutorial duty to disclose it. 
hence, Appellant's right to due process has been violated. 
The conviction must be set aside since: 
" ... The report might not have been 
proof of the defendant's innocence, but if 
its contents had been known, it might well 
have nurtured, even generated, a reasonable 
doubt as to guilt. One cannot possibly say 
with any confidence that such a defect in 
the trial was harmless. A procedure so 
burdened with the tendency to harm accords 
a defendant less than due process." 
Barbee v. Warden, supra., at 847. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW APPLIED Al.\1 ERRONEOUS 
STANDARD IN DETERdUll~TG THE EFFECT OF 
THE NEW EVIDE~KE 
The court below found there was no "willful" withholding 
of information by either police or prosecution. The court rulec 
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it did not believe the inconsistencies between the two reports 
1wuld have made any difference in the conduct of the trial. 
(R. 1238) The court ruled that because the new evidence would 
not make any difference to the outcome of the trial, the Petition 
and Motion of Appellant must be denied. (R. 1234-1238) 
Appellant contends that such a ruling was based upon a 
completely erroneous standard of "making any difference" in the 
trial outcome. It does not matter if the new evidence "would 
have made a difference" or "affected the outcome" or any such 
similar standard. 
One of the cases cited by the State in its memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 1005) is most helpful to 
Appellant on this issue. That case is United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs the defendant was convicted of 
second degree murder for the stabbing of a man in a motel room. 
Her defense was self-defense. After trial, her attorney dis-
covered the victim had past convictions for carrying a concealed 
'"eapon. On a motion for a new trial she claimed the evidence, had 
it been shown at trial, would have been favorable to her claim 
of self defense. Before trial she made no request for such 
information. The Court, in passing upon the claim, noted three 
1istinct types of cases where evidence was known to the prosecution 
~t not the defense. The first is where the prosecation's case 
includes perjured testimony and the prosecution knew, or should 
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have known of the perjury. In such a case if the evidence would 
"in any reasonable likelihood" affect the verdict, the judgment 
must be set aside. The second type of case was the Brady, supra. 
situation, where there is a pretrial request for specific informa· 
tion. In that case, the court said in Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 
if the suppressed evidence "might have affected the outcome of 
the trial" relief is to be granted. Agurs is often cited for a 
"higher" standard of proof for the defense because it involved 
the third type of case and a higher standard must be met by the 
defense in that t;·;:;e .Jf :::ase. That is, where there is no request 
by defense forany specific type of material, the judgment will no: 
be set aside unless the defense can show that the omitted evidenu 
resulted in a denial of a fair trial. 427 U.S. at 108. Thus, 
where there is a specific request the defendant does not have to 
meet the severe burden of "demonstrating that the newly discovere: 
evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal." 427 U.S. a: 
111. 
Appellant also contends that implicit in Agurs is the 
notion that the defense "burden" to show the result of the newly 
uncovered evidence is less where the prosecution has "hidden" 
the evidence than where the evidence has been discovered from 
a neutral source. Thus, if a piece of physical evidence or a 
witness is found after trial by the defense, and the prosecutior. 
had no knowledge of it, it may be reasonable to expect the defer.s 
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co show more fully the result that the new evidence may have had 
on the verdict. But, where the prosecution had that evidence, to 
require the defense to bear that same burden destroys any incentive 
that the prosecutor might have for turning over the evidence to 
rhe defense. If the defense is going to have to "prove" the 
effect of the new evidence on the verdict, why give it to him - he 
1,ill have a difficult time and the prosecution is not "motivated" 
to turn the material over to the defense. This is the identical 
rationale behind the exclusionary rule. 
This "Standard of Proof" the defense must bear is clearly 
very crucial in "new evidence" cases. For the court below to apply 
an erroneous standard, as it did, is to miss the entire thrust of 
Appellant's motion. Appellant submits that to require him to show 
that the newly discovered evidence would "have made a different" 
in the trial outcome is to require something that the law does 
~ot require and that would be virtually impossible to prove. If 
Appellant shows, and he submits he has, that the evidence "might 
~ave" affected the trial then he has met the requirements of the 
law. Because the court below applied an erroneous standard, 
Appellant submits this court should reverse the judgment of the 
court below and grant Appellant a new trial. 
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POINT IV 
DISCLOSURE PRIOR TO TRIAL OF DETECTIVE THOMPSON'S 
FALSE A..~D MISLEADING REPORT REPRESENTS GOVERNMENTAL 
MISCONDUCT, CORRUPTS THE TRUTH-SEEKING FUHCTION OF 
A FAIR TRIAL, AND VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 
It has long been recognized that when the State includes 
in its case evidence or testimony which it knows or should know 
is false, then a violation of due process of law has occurred. 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 79 L.Ed. 791, 44 S.Ct. 340 
(1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 87 L.Ed. 214, 63 S. Ct. 
177 (1946). The United States Supreme Court has found error even j 
when the State's complicity was passive, since "(t)he same resul: 
obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, 
allows it to go uncorrected." Giglio v. United States, supra., 
405 U.S. at 153. As reflected in Napue v. Illinois, supra., 
the falsehood need not be limited to matters going only to the 
actual guilt or innocence of the accused: 
"The principle that a State may not 
knowingly use false evidence, including 
false testimony, to obtain a tainted con-
viction, implicit in any ordered concept 
of liberty, does not cease to apply merely 
because the false testimony goes only to 
the credibility of the witness." 
~. 360 U.S. at 269. 
The purpose of the discussion which follows is to draw 
an analogy between the use of false testimony cited above, and, 
as in the present case, the State's delivery to the defense of 
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1: 
a false and misleading police report concerning a critical pre-
trial identification session involving the State's sole eyewitness. 
The released report gave a somewhat favorable and positive 
account of the showing by Detective Thompson of Appellant's 
picture to Carol DaRonch. Unfortunately, this witness was unable 
to recall during her testimony at the trial just what had trans-
?ired during the photographic display in question, what she said 
at that time, or even if she had picked anyone. (R. 408-411) 
However, she did testify to the effect that she saw Appellant's 
picture on that occasion. (R. 408) During the preliminary 
hearing she said that upon seeing Appellant's picture her 
response was: "These look a lot like him, but I'm not sure." 
(P.H. tr 69) The impression that she identified Appellant's picture 
is subsequently supported by the testimony of the officer who 
authored the falsified report, and showed DaRonch the first photo 
display containing Appellant's picture, Detective Thompson. 
He testified that she pulled Appellant's picture from a stack 
and stated, "Yes, I believe that looks a lot like the individual." 
(R. 497) This account is contradicted by, or at least signifi-
cantly modified by Thompson's report suppressed by the State, 
but the defense was powerless to effectively impeach Thompson, 
or for that matter, DaRonch, without knowledge of evidence of 
the prior inconsistant statements contained in the suppressed 
'lersion. 
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Appellant's position is that Thompson's testimony amounts 
to perjury, or a strong inference thereof. Most blatantly false ' 
is his testimony that, after what he refers to as a tentative 
identification by the eyewitness, DaRonch, he thought he was 
"close". (R. 504) Because of this he maintained that he was 
justified in showing DaRonch a second photograph of Appellant 
a few days later. (R. 504) The clear inference he makes here 
is that DaRonch was a reliable enough witness that she was 
either "close" to a positive identification or that he was "close' 
to an arrest in the case. No matter what rationale he uses in 
an attempt to legitimize the second display, the suppressed 
version of this incident indicates that DaRonch may not have even 
tenatively identified Appellant's photo, that Thompson thought 
her to be a "very poor witness", that he was looking for witnesse; 1 
I 
other than DaRonch to view Appellant in a lineup, and that she 
did not think she could identify her abductor if she saw him. 
These are not the kinds of facts and observations which would 
make a man feel "close" to anything. Thompson's credibility and 
DaRonch's reliability as an eyewitness are brought clearly into 
question by the suppressed report. 
According to United States v. Agurs, supra. , if the undis-
closed evidence shows that "the prosecution knew or should have 
known of the perjury", then the conviction: 
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s· 
" ... must be set aside if there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false testi-
mony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury ... (T)he court has applied a strict 
standard of materiality, not just because 
they (the false evidence cases) involve 
prosecutorial misconduct, but more im-
portantly they involve a corruption of the 
truth-seeking function of the fair trial 
process." 
~. 49 L.Ed. 2d at 349-350. 
The Agurs "reasonable likelihood" test was based on similar 
tests used in Giglio, supra., and Napue, supra. It is applicable 
to this case because (1) the undisclosed evidence shows Thompson's 
and DaRonch's testimony to be false or misleading, and (2) the 
delivery of the false report to the defense prior to trial amounts 
to the use of false evidence and is a corruption of the truth-
seeking process . 
Perhaps the most insidious effect of this kind of false 
evidence shows itself not on the stand directly, but in the manner 
in which it blunts and misleads the pretrial preparation of the 
defense. The defense received, prior to trial, a report which 
falsely portrays the State's principle witness as having made 
an identification of the accused through photographs and that 
this same witness was ready, willing and able to identify her 
abductor in a lineup. This witness would not talk to defense 
attorneys prior to trial (P.H. tr. 75, 120), which left only 
Thompson, the author of both the falsified report and the suppressed 
:eport, to verify the accuracy of the falsified report. This he 
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did do on numerous occasions in the courtroom when using the 
falsified report to "refresh" his memory on the witness stand. f 
Misled into believing the report, even defense attorneys began tc T 
mouth the words and phrases of falsified statements attributed 
to Ms. DaRonch. Such a deciption is as serious a violation of t:., 
truthseeking function of the fair trial process as overt perjury 
In Napue v. Illinois, supra., the Supreme Court makes 
reference to a portion of an opinion in People v. Savvides, 136 
N.E.2d 853, 854, 855 (1956): 
"It is cf no consequence that the 
falsehood bore ~con the witness' credi-
bility rather than directly upon the 
defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no 
matter what its subject, and, if it is 
in any way relevant to the case, the 
district atto1~ey has the responsibility 
and duty to correct what he knew to be 
false and elicit the truth ... That the 
district attorney's silence was not the 
result of guile or a desire to prejudice 
matters little, for its impact was the 
same, preventing as it did, a trial that 
could in any real sense be termed fair." 
Napue v. Illinois, supra., 360 U.S. at 369-370. 
The information suppressed by the State is directly relev': 
to this case and the credibility of its key witnesses. There is 
a reasonable likelihood that the false and misleading report and 
testimony based on that report could have influenced the trier 
of fact. 
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This Court cannot allow to go uncorrected instances where 
false and misleading testimony played a key role in the trial. 
tc The conviction must be set aside and a new trial granted. 
tb 
ry 
Ls 
POINT V 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT WAS THE 
RESULT OF UNNECESSARILY SUGGESTIVE PROCEDURES 
IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
In Point I of Appellant's original brief and reply brief 
he argued that the eyewitness identification procedures were 
improper. (Appellant's Brief 12-20) Obviously the additional 
fact brought out in Appellant's Motion for a New Trial affect the 
argument presented there. Appellant contends that his position 
is strengthened on this issue. The State in its' brief argued 
that Appellant was merely setting forth theories and was making 
bald accusations. Appellant will not here reargue the point 
made clear in Point I of the original brief and in this brief 
that the witness Carol DaRonch was at first a very unsure witness 
who later made a "positive identification" because of the conduct 
of law enforcement personnel set forth in this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, that the court below erred 
i~ denying Appellant's ~otion for a ~ew Trial or Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief, Appellant respectfully submits that the 
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order of the Court below should be reversed and the matter re-
manded for a new trial. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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